| T
H E M
E
S
1
|
John Dewey's Conception of the
Role and Methods of Philosophy
By Richard Markham John Dewey knew he was living in the midst of economic, scientific, political and religious developments signaling the end of the modern era and the beginning of an age yet to be clearly defined. He devoted a lifetime to exploring the implications and ramifications of these developments, including the need for what he called a reconstruction in philosophy. What should be the role of philosophy in the post-modern age and what methods should philosophers use to make the most fruitful contributions to society? He developed answers to these questions compatible with his evolutionary naturalism, answers which can still speak to us as we confront the challenges of a new century. Dewey often contrasted his positions with those of traditional philosophy on the one hand and, on the other, with those twentieth century philosophers content to focus on matters of language and logic. Traditionally, most philosophers sought to rise above the conditions and circumstances of their times in search of a system of thought embodying "higher" truths and values. They were persons of vast learning who, in relative seclusion, sought insight into an ultimate reality transcending immediate experience and who, from time to time, shared the fruits of their labors with less ambitious souls. Dewey respected the systematic contributions made by traditional philosophers within their differing historical contexts |
| T
H E M
E
S
1
|
and he made frequent references to them in his writings, but he agreed with others that it was time for philosophers, indeed all of us, to give up the search for final answers. Traditional philosophical systems, though admirably systematic, generally were too abstract to have much practical value. "The charge that is brought against the non-empirical method of philosophizing is not that it depends upon theorizing, but that it fails to use refined, secondary products as a path pointing and leading back to something in primary experience." (Experience and Nature, 6) Throughout his career, Dewey became increasingly critical of those who continued a "quest for certainty," whether they sought comfort in some set of supernatural beliefs or whether they strove to establish fixed and final natural laws. Either way, from his point of view, the energy expended seeking definition of some ultimate reality could be better spent tackling issues and problems that surround us. He disagreed just as much with the tendency of many twentieth- century philosophers who, like him, abandoned the quest to find absolute and universal truths but who, in contrast, saw no role for philosophy to play in addressing major social issues. They carved out a radically diminished role for philosophy and pursued goals much more modest than those of traditional philosophers Many of this new breed tended to disregard the contributions of philosophers in the past, to concentrate instead on language and logic analyses, and to isolate themselves from the issues and events of the century. Late in his life, he expressed his concerns about this trend to the Graduate Department of Philosophy at Columbia University: The most discouraging thing in philosophy is neo-scholastic formalism which also happened in the |
| T
H E M
E
S
1
|
Middle Ages. It is form today for its own sake, in so many cases. A form of forms, not forms of subject matter. But the subject matter is so chaotic and confused today in the world that it is difficult to handle. This is how I would explain this retreat from work in the facts of human life into purely formal issues. I hesitate to call them issues because nothing ever issues except more form! (Miscellaneous Writings 469) Dewey affirmed the need for formal analysis in the work of philosophy, but not if was analysis in a vacuum, divorced from the real-life social, political, religious, and ethical issues facing us in this challenging period of human history. So, for Dewey, instead of searching for ultimate truths on the one hand, or falling victim to the paralysis of analysis on the other, philosophers should acquire the perspectives necessary to discern underlying cultural movements and dilemmas which escape common notice and which fuel the conflicts and perplexities within various domains of human conduct. He was a new kind of philosopher, one who saw philosophical activity as an integral part and outgrowth of social experience rather than as an abstract endeavor set apart from the major issues of any age. Drawing upon the best of relevant past and present thought, philosophers should employ analytical skills to define problematic situations more completely. Having done so, they should not shrink from offering creative solutions and subjecting their proposals to the critical eye of others. Philosophers should once again engage in the search for wisdom, not the kind of wisdom pursued by traditional philosophies, but the only kind of wisdom capable of producing fruitful results, namely the kind of wisdom that is the product of informed and intelligent inquiry. In |
| T
H E M
E
S
1
|
Experience and Nature, Dewey offered what he called a first-rate test of the value of any philosophy: Does it end in conclusions which, when they are referred back to ordinary life-experiences, render them more significant, more luminous to us, and make our dealings with them more fruitful? Or does it terminate in rendering the things of ordinary experience more opaque than they were before....Does it yield the enrichment and increase of power of ordinary things which the results of physical science afford when applied in everyday affairs? Or does it become a mystery that these ordinary things should be what they are; and are philosophic concepts left to dwell in separation in some technical realm of their own? It is the fact, I repeat, that so many philosophies terminate in conclusions that make it necessary to disparage and condemn primary experience....which leads cultivated common-sense to look askance at philosophy. (7-8) What are the kinds of problems and issues Dewey believed most require the attention of philosophers? During his lifetime, Dewey witnessed the shift from an agricultural to an urban way of life, vast improvements in the means of communication and transportation, and the growth of large, complex institutions. The transformations wrought by the industrial and technological revolutions radically altered the way most humans lived their day-to-day lives. At the same time, he was convinced that most people still clung to ideas and beliefs about God, about the nature of reality, about human nature, and about the nature of truth which were the product ofpre-scientific belief systems. As Dewey put it, "Habits of thought and desire remain in substance what they were before the rise of science, while the conditions |
| T
H E M
E
S
1
|
under which they take effect have been radically altered by science." (Philosophy and Civilization 318) The disjunctions between the old and new were manifest in many ways. In the political realm the weapons of war had become more terrible while nations still clung to nationalistic beliefs and hierarchical structures of authority characteristic of the modern era from 1600-1914. In the domain of religion, science and Biblical research seriously questioned traditional beliefs, yet many still held to literal interpretations of their central texts. In education, factory models predominated even though studies of psychological development supported more fluid organizational arrangements. In ethics, the foundations of traditional moral frameworks were shaken by events in the twentieth century, yet people continued to view ethical standards as absolutes. If Dewey were living today, he would argue rigidly held moral views are too static to cope with the numerous dilemmas resulting from developments in modern genetics. At a deeper level was the disjunction between traditional dualistic patterns of thought on the one hand and, on the other, scientific discoveries making untenable such dichotomies as mind-body, individual-society, subject-object, experience-nature, spiritual-material. For Dewey, such dualities are the products of outworn assumptions about reality, human nature, and truth, and as long as we hang onto those assumptions we'll be blocked from resolving apparent dichotomies and achieving a coherent, consistent world view compatible with the findings of modern science. So, philosophers should be concerned with the disjunctions between old and new cultural conditions and with the indefensible continuation |
| T
H E M
E
S
1
|
of dualistic thinking. Minor adjustments in traditional patterns of thought will not be sufficient. For Dewey, the number of dualities and the magnitude of social problems and conflicts are such as to require nothing less than a wholesale transformation in our basic assumptions about reality, about human nature, and about truth. Only such a large-scale, systematic revision of traditional paradigms will allow fruitful resolutions of major issues and dualities. Especially to be questioned is the traditional notion that there is an absolute and more perfect reality transcending human experience, that such a reality is accessible to human reason, that knowledge is the product of reasoned efforts to know that ultimate realm, and that our notion of what is true and good at our level of existence should strive to approximate absolute truths and values located in the higher reality. Such traditional notions are part and parcel of a medieval perspective which, in modified form, continued to prevail into the twentieth century and still echoes today. Our language is shot through and through with references to levels of being, higher and lower truths, superior and inferior forms of life. Many still speak of a heaven above and a fiery hell below. Our institutions largely are hierarchically organized, reflecting age-old patterns of authority. Dewey believed it absolutely imperative that hierarchical conceptions of reality give way to an evolutionary world view if we are to reduce the discord among people, resolve the dualities in our thinking, and fashion a more aesthetically gratifying existence. Bringing about a transformation will require building upon significant twentieth-century movements in science and philosophy that grew out of developments begun several centuries ago when the Copernican and Newtonian revolutions changed forever the idea that the earth was at the center of a spherical universe. Dewey was fully cognizant that such developments were culminating in a view of reality as an immense and ever-changing cosmos, not a great chain of being. Instead of a closed universe, science now presents us with |
| T
H E M
E
S
1
|
one infinite in space and time, having no limits here or there, at this end, so to speak, or at that, and as infinitely complex in internal structure as it is infinite in extent. Hence it is also an open world, an infinitely variegated one, a world which in the old sense can hardly be called a universe at all; so multiplex and far-reaching that it cannot be summed up and grasped in any one formula. (Reconstruction in Philosophy 54) The universe, incredibly vast, virtually limitless in extent, expanding rapidly since the Big Bang some 15 billion years ago, may have no absolute beginning nor any absolute end. It's differentiated in a marvelous variety of ways ranging from the smallest invisible phenomena to distant stars accessible only with the largest and most powerful telescopes. This reality is far more complex, far less certain and secure than the hierarchical levels of reality conceived in the past within which human beings were considered to occupy a special place. But it also is far more mysterious and interesting and far richer in possibilities. In addition to transforming our thinking about reality, we must alter traditional conceptions of human nature, which, if they go unchallenged, will continue to fuel human conflicts. As long as we continue to believe that each human being is a special creation of God and is endowed with an individual and eternal soul, we'll continue to fight over which God has created some of us more special than others. Darwin's theory of evolution, bolstered by subsequent advances in genetics, undermines the notion that human beings occupy some special central place in the scheme of things. Humans are but one species among millions and millions of others that have come and gone. We are as much part of the natural world as are other species of plants and animals. Yes, we differ in that our species has evolved a complex and intricate brain structure making it possible to invent and utilize a vast range of symbol systems with which we represent features of immediate |
| T
H E M
E
S
1
|
experience and endeavor to make sense of the greater reality. But we are not creatures endowed with a soul having supernatural origins. We must come to accept our place within the elaborate and intricate fabric of nature and realize that we need to continue to adapt if we are not to join the millions of other species that have come and gone. For Dewey, the shift from hierarchical to evolutionary conceptions of reality and human nature also has drastic implications for how we think about the nature of truth. Instead of conceiving Truth to occupy some imaginary higher realm, we must accept that the truths we live by are partial and tentative, subject to change as required to meet the challenges of evolving circumstances. No longer can any individual or culture lay claim to having a privileged and exclusive corner on what is true, right, and good Each of us has a unique genetic configuration and operates within particular cultural contexts, and our perspectives are thereby limited. No person or culture has a God's eye view of our circumstances. Does this mean that all truths are of equal value? Not for Dewey. Some truths are more soundly established than others because they are the product of informed and intelligent inquiry. They are not final truths, but they can withstand public scrutiny better than others that are the products of habit, custom, convention, and superficial opinion uncritically examined. Acceptance of our place within a changing cosmos will bring us to acknowledge that all categories of thought arise out of human experience, that knowledge should be used instrumentally, and that warranted judgments about truth and good are the outcome of |
| T
H E M
E
S
1
|
careful observations and reasoned hypotheses rigorously tested. The role of philosophy is to elaborate and communicate these new conceptions of reality, human nature, and truth, to show how they resolve troubling dualities, and to explore their implications for how we conduct our affairs in every domain of human life. This is what Dewey sought to do; his numerous articles and books stand as testimony of his commitment to the "reconstruction of philosophy." His works address significant issues in art, religion, politics, logic, ethics, and especially in education. Throughout all of them, he contrasted his new ways of thinking with patterns of thought we should outgrow, and utilized methods of inquiry compatible with his underlying assumptions about reality, human nature, and truth. What methods of effective inquiry will make the most fruitful contributions to society? Dewey answered these questions most thoroughly and systematically in books like How We Think and Logic: The Theory of Inquiry. True to his evolutionary convictions, he believed all human inquiries follow a basic pattern operating within all living things, namely that of experiencing needs, exerting efforts to satisfy those needs, and enjoying satisfactory consummations. Because of the human capacity for complex symbol systems, the "needs" we experience are much more complex and varied than those of simpler forms of life, the "efforts" we exert are more elaborate and potent, and the "consummations" we can experience are far richer. This underlying pattern of inquiry is manifest in all human activities, whether in our personal lives, our occupational and professional responsibilities, or our artistic and scientific endeavors. As models of informed and intelligent inquiry, |
| T
H E M
E
S
1
|
he referenced the methods so evident in the contributions of science over the past several centuries. Experiencing the desire to probe the secrets of nature, scientists have defined problems clearly, articulated hypotheses, and tested them rigorously in the hopes of achieving satisfactory and defendable results. Throughout, they have drawn upon the accumulated wisdom of the past without becoming its prisoner, gathered and analyzed relevant data without undue prejudice, and creatively proposed solutions without naive expectations of receiving unquestioned agreement from their peers. All of us benefit from the fruits of scientific inquiry, but untold further values would accrue were we to practice in all realms of human life the reflective modes of thought exemplified by the best of scientific research. In this endeavor, philosophers should take the lead. Departing from their traditional role of using reason and/or faith to access a presumed higher realm of Truth, they must practice informed and intelligent inquiry as the surest means for challenging the hierarchical patterns of thought appropriate for an earlier age and for proposing solutions to fundamental questions and issues. The reconstruction to be undertaken is not that of applying "intelligence" as something ready made. It is to carry over into any inquiry into human and moral subjects the kind of method (the method of observation, theory as hypothesis, and experimental test) by which understanding of physical nature has been brought to its present pitch. (Reconstruction in Philosophy, ix) Throughout their work, philosophers must perform two functions, one critical or analytic, the other hypothetical or visionary. The critical or analytic function clears the way for the second. Performing the |
| T
H E M
E
S
1
|
critical function requires that philosophers examine the roots of whatever problem they are addressing. This is not easy because philosophers, themselves, are products of the past and must, if they are to perform a leadership role in helping influence others and the public at large to alter their own "outworn attitudes," work to disentangle themselves from ideas and themes that hinder progress. As Dewey put it: . . . Philosophy has now to do a hard and, for many of us, a disagreeable job. This is the work of getting rid, by means of thinking as exact and critical as possible, of perpetuations of those outworn attitudes which prevent those engaged in philosophical reflection from seizing the opportunities now open. This is the critical, or, if one please, the negative, aspect of the task to be undertaken in the present state of philosophy. (Problems of Men 16) But it will not be enough for philosophers to perform a critical function within their own domain and within society at large. Being analytical only prepares the ground for creative speculation. Philosophers must not shrink from this challenge. Drawing upon the wisdom of the past and relevant contributions of science, they should engage in formulating imaginative hypotheses for dealing with the problems of men. Philosophy still has a work to do. . . . It may turn to the projection of large generous hypotheses which, if used as plans of action, will give intelligent direction to men in search for ways to make the world more one of worth and significance, more homelike, in fact. There is no phase of life, educational, economic, political, religious, in which inquiry may not aid in bringing to birth that world which Matthew Arnold rightly said was as yet unborn. Present-day philosophy cannot desire a |
| T
H E M
E
S
1
|
better work than to engage in the act of midwifery that was assigned to it by Socrates twenty-five hundred years ago. (Problems of Men 20) Lest Dewey be misunderstood, it may be well to reemphasize that he was not advocating that philosophers attempt great syntheses that would solve human problems for all time. The speculations and visions of philosophers are hypothetical, subject to the test of human experience. Dewey was dedicated completely to the notion that our categories of thought, our "objects of reflection," "secondary objects," "hypotheses," "refined objects," have value only to the extent that they enrich primary experience. This conviction is manifested in his constant emphasis of the importance of a thoroughly empirical technique, one involving the double movement back and forth between theory and practice. [The primary concern of philosophy] is to clarify, liberate, and extend the goods which inhere in the naturally generated functions of experience. It has no call to create a world of "reality" de novo nor to delve into secrets of Being hidden from common-sense and science. It has no stock of information or body of knowledge peculiarly its own. . . . Its business is to accept and to utilize for a purpose the best available knowledge of its own time and place. And this purpose is criticism of beliefs, institutions, customs, policies with respect to their bearing upon good. This does not mean their bearing upon the good, as something itself attained and formulated in philosophy. For as philosophy has no private store of knowledge or of methods for attaining truth, so it has no private access to good. As it accepts knowledge of facts and principles from those competent in inquiry and discovery, so it accepts the goods that are diffused in human experience. It has no Mosaic nor Pauline authority of revelation entrusted to it. But it has the authority of intelligence, of criticism of these common and natural goods. (Experience and Nature 407-408) Application of intelligence, using the inquiry methods proven by science, drawing upon relevant knowledge constructed in |
| T
H E M
E
S
1
|
various disciplines, gradually constructing trenchant hypotheses, these are among the hallmarks of Dewey's conception of the methods necessary for philosophy to fulfill its new role. Unsatisfied with abstract recommendations, Dewey filled his writings with examples wherein he practiced what he preached. Take first his way of resolving the seemingly irreconcilable dualities referenced earlier in this paper and lingering on in our century. First, through careful analysis, it was necessary to understand their roots in past cultural conditions. Dualisms such as mind-body have a long history and for centuries were not deemed problematic; they were compatible with hierarchical conceptions of reality, human nature, and truth. As long as minds were considered the instrument for accessing higher levels of reality and truth; as long as bodies were trapped in a lower reality; as long as a spiritual soul was assumed to have access to God and to have priority over one's material body; as long as the Church was the accepted institution having responsibility for the moral well-being of humanity, and secular institutions were responsible for secular matters, everything fit. But this integrated system was challenged by the rise of science in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and dualities became problematic. Intellectuals were conflicted between the claims of faith and the claims of science, between the religious and the secular. To avoid cognitive dissonance, the uneasy compromise was to compartmentalize. Separate mind and body. Separate the domains of religion and science, the spiritual and material. Distinguish subjective selves from objective nature. But compartmentalization, albeit a temporary solution, is not intellectually satisfying. Hence, long debates continue today about how mind is related to body, about whether there is a spiritual dimension transcending material existence, about the lines of demarcation between individual and society, |
| T
H E M
E
S
1
|
about how to distinguish the subjective and the objective. Dewey believed resolution of problematic dualities will come only when we surrender the hierarchical paradigm supporting them and begin to explore the rich potential of an evolutionary frame of reference. To illustrate further, consider the still often accepted dualism between mind and body. Such a notion has its origins in the class structure of ancient Greece and the Platonic notion that reason should subordinate the senses. The life of the mind was superior to activities of the body. Christianity sharpened the distinction between mind and body by associating the mental with eternal life, with spirituality, and with potential for improvement and associating the body with temporal concerns, with materiality, and with susceptibility to the influence of evil. God gave humans dominion over nature and the free will to choose between the higher life of the soul and the temptations of the body. Given the scientific discoveries of the past two centuries, such dualistic thinking is no longer defensible. Drawing upon the contributions of modern science, Dewey sees no sharp separation between mind and body, between mental operations and natural processes. The operations we associate with reasoning (the ability to classify phenomena, analyze, explore assumptions, think logically, discern patterns among processes, and other such mental abilities) are operations within nature and are analogous with organic activity at lower levels of complexity. "The mind is within the world as a part of the latter's own ongoing process. It is marked off as mind by the fact that wherever it is found, changes take place in a directed way, so that a movement in a definite one-way sense-from the doubtful and confused to the clear, resolved and settled-takes place" (Quest for Certainty 291). There is no need to resort to supernatural explanations to account for the operations of intelligence we associate with mind. This is |
| T
H E M
E
S
1
|
not the place to go into greater detail concerning Dewey's concept of mind; suffice it to say that his views contrasted radically from older ways of thinking. The old center was mind knowing by means of an equipment of powers complete within itself, and merely exercised upon an antecedent external material equally complete in itself. The new center is indefinite interactions taking place within a course of nature which is not fixed and complete, but which is capable of direction to new and different results through the mediation of intentional operations. Neither self nor world, neither soul nor nature (in the sense of something isolated and finished in its isolation) is the center, any more than either earth or sun is the absolute center of a single universal and necessary frame of reference. (Quest for Certainty 290) Dewey's methods when addressing dualities were identical to those employed when he wrote about social, political, religious, and educational issues. Define a problem, analyze the roots of conventional alternatives, and propose solutions grounded in his evolutionary naturalism. For example, with respect to education, he recognized that those advocating structure, discipline, and a tight curriculum on the one hand and those supporting looser reins and student choice of curriculum on the other actually were giving expression to different poles of a structure-freedom duality. The advocates of structure believed that established truths were approximations of some higher reality and therefore should drive the curriculum; the supporters of freedom challenged this traditional paradigm but their solutions amounted to rebellion against its grip rather than representing a creative new approach grounded in assumptions compatible with modern science. Dewey agreed that the traditional structure, curriculum, and methods prevailing in traditional schools needed change, but he was no advocate of free schools where children could study |
| T
H E M
E
S
1
|
whatever and whenever they wished. Accumulated knowledge from the past is to be valued and transmitted to new generations but not as a load of predigested facts. Instead, teachers should structure their classrooms in a way that builds upon children's curiosity about their natural and social environment, and should then nourish the underlying pattern of inquiry children share with all forms of life by fueling it with relevant knowledge drawn from a valued past. The aim throughout should be to develop within children the patterns of informed and intelligent thinking so necessary if they are to become creative and productive citizens as adults. If we were to accept Dewey's conception of the role and methods of philosophy and agree with his conviction that we need a wholesale transformation in our conceptions of reality, human nature, and truth, might there not be a price to pay? If we embrace his views, will it not mean sacrificing the morals and values we've associated with a spiritual realm? If all that we've associated with being distinctively human can be explained as the product of natural processes, what happens to the notion of a soul, to the integrity of the person, to our religious rituals? While not denying that an evolutionary perspective will require giving up some of these notions and practices, Dewey believed that the values we've long revered need not be sacrificed by operating within an evolutionary paradigm. Fear of their loss occurs only if one assumes that the values we hold dear have their ultimate location within a higher spiritual realm and are accessible only through reason or faith. In fact, all the goods and values ever experienced are the products of human interactions with the rest of a natural world indescribably rich in qualities and potential. Every moment of our lives has a qualitative dimension and the goods we experience are simply those which are drawn from an immense pool of latent others. Over the |
| T
H E M
E
S
1
|
centuries, we've come to revere some goods more than others, converting them into chosen values. Many of these, such as love, compassion, reverence for life, respect for other persons, are ones we've associated with religion and spirituality. There is no reason why we should not continue to hold these values in high esteem. Indeed, they should operate as "principles" regulating our conduct as we seek to realize the goals and objectives Dewey called ends-in-view. There is no need to imagine values as located in some superior realm, accessible only to a favored few. Indeed, to the extent that we employ the operations of intelligence to achieve desired ends rather than experiencing feelings of guilt because we haven't lived up to some impossible standard, they will become more accessible to all. On the brink of a new millennium, we are yet in the midst of a transition from a world dominated by traditional belief systems to an epoch still not clearly defined. We are experiencing some of the confusion and disorientation to be expected anytime longstanding habits and expectations don't seem to square with the demands of new situations. The conditions under which we are living are both exciting and turbulent and we are faced with the challenge of how to resolve major social issues and of how to live our lives in the century soon to be born. More than ever before, our survival is at risk. Dewey believed we must resist the temptation to escape into the false security of traditional thought patterns, which no longer have credibility. They simply are no longer efficacious; clinging to them will only perpetuate the current crisis and hasten our demise. Instead, with a new breed of philosophers leading the way, we should utilize informed and intelligent methods of inquiry when defining the problems before us, explore possible options, and try solutions we believe will have the best chance of maximizing the values we hold dear. |
| T
H E M
E
S
1
|
Works Cited
Dewey, John. Experience and Nature. 2nd ed. Open Court Publishing Company,
1929. New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1958.
|