Volume 2 • Number 3                    February 1995
 

INSIDE THIS ISSUE:

DEBATING MULTICULTURALISM
Response to Hildebrandt

ON PORNOGRAPHY AND DOMINATION
Responses to Silliman

IF A TREE FALLS, CONT.
Further Reflections on the Constructivism-Realism Debate

 Debating Multiculturalism

Charles Hildebrandt

For the last several years, "multiculturalism" and "diversity" have been significant buzzwords on college and university campuses.  These words also seem to have some relationship to a very vague, but significantly traumatizing phrase, "political correctness."

Recently in my American Minority Groups class, I filled the chalkboard with the traditional terminology used in Minority Studies -- annihilation, expulsion, stratification, segregation, pluralism, assimilation, amalgamation, and others.  And then one alert student asked a legitimate question:  why had I not listed, defined, or even mentioned "multiculturalism"?  After a lively class discussion, my response was that after teaching about minorities for thirty-two years, I do not know what multiculturalism means or represents.

But no doubt about it, it is an "in word," especially in academia, in the media, and in the corporate boardrooms of America.  Whatever it is, it certainly appears to be important to conservative, liberal, and radical mentalities alike, no doubt for different reasons.

Within academia, why should we need multiculturalism when we have anthropologists?  They have been teaching about multiple cultures for a long time now.  Unlike anthropology, this umbrella concept of multiculturalism does not really get serious.  Are we really ready to confront all the implied variables?  By its very name, multiculturalism ignores the dirtiest and most dangerous four letter word of them all -- "race."  How is race multicultural?  And are we really ready to talk about the myriad religions and creeds with their conflicts, their ambitions, and, at times, their cruelties?  Unfortunately, to talk about religion is often considered to be unfair and impolite.  And are we really ready to talk about that most unspoken, almost taboo ingredient of the "American Way of Life," social class, which runs along a continuum from the immensely wealthy to the permanently poor and homeless?  And how does multiculturalism address genocide, in this, the bloodiest century in world history? Multiculturalism confronting genocide is like Bambi confronting Godzilla.

And then there is diversity, which is certainly a safe and generic idea, comprehensive and inclusive.  This mild descriptive noun apparently implies the celebration of human differences.  Celebrations are often engaging, but then what?  How about an older idea, pluralism -- the idea of peoples who are "diverse" living compatibly within the same society, but at the same time, encouraged and supported to maintain their own identities and cultures?  Though pluralism is a rare and delicate flower, we do have historical and contemporary examples of it.  Who needs diversity?

Why not retrieve and include an admirable old idea -- civility? Under that umbrella, we can talk about, maybe even foster, such human capacities as kindness, gentleness, consideration, friendliness, sympathy, understanding, humaneness, patience, mutual respect, and (heaven help us) courtesy.  In fact, are these not the anticipated and hoped for consequences of a liberal arts education -- to learn and live those values of civility? And why do we persist in referring to the liberal arts as "general education requirements" or some other such dull, indeterminate label? Why would anyone want one of those? We are so fortunate in academia to have the liberal arts and sciences requirements as a gateway to civility and pluralism.

In fostering these goals as members of a specific nation, we must know who we are and where we came from.  We must know our history, literature and art.  At the same time, we must be sharply wary of all "centrisms," whether Euro, Afro, ethno, or ego.  Let us all do our part in academia and elsewhere, without responding to the latest fads and foibles of quick-fix language.  Instead, may we together teach, learn, and work toward a civil and plural future.

Charles Hildebrandt teaches Sociology at Keene State College

Raymond J. Rodrigues

After questioning terms like multiculturalism and diversity, and taking the pro forma swipe at the media-bred term "political correctness," and, later, after a concern that diversity and pluralism also do not capture exactly what it is we should be working toward, Professor Hildebrandt seems to prefer civility.  But then he attacks the phrase general education requirements and argues for liberal arts.  Finally he settles upon pluralism and civility as the practices we should be working toward.

I believe that Professor Hildebrandt's argument is that these are all value-laden terms, and, as such, they suffer from inexact definitions and applications.  If each, in addition, has a slightly different focus, why don't we just settle upon pluralism and civility? That is, why don't we simply accept the differences in others and learn to respect one another?

I would argue that we do not do that because we have yet to confront forthrightly the real issues that divide us.  In the middle of his thoughts, Professor Hildebrandt claims that talking about social class is "almost taboo."  There, I believe, he approaches one of the reasons why many of us feel so strongly about he need to confront the issues that are encompassed by terms like multi-culturalism and diversity.

I believe that class issues and power relationships are the two major concerns that we must address if we are to begin moving toward Professor Hildebrandt's pluralistic and civil world.  More than any other single factor, class is what divides us as a people.  It happens that race and ethnicity are, as a result of historical events, tied to class levels, but class cuts across race and ethnicity.  Fewer poor whites go to college than middle-class African Americans and Latinos.  But more African Americans and Latinos are in the class of the poor.

Furthermore, class distinctions are often reinforced through power relationships.  Power relationships are revealed through gender distinctions, age distinctions, race relations, ethnic stereotypes, physical abilities, employer/employee relationships, and yes, the relationship between a professor and a student.  To deny that these differences and power relations exist and may be abused is to fail to realize the real reason why so many of us are concerned about who determines what should be taught and how.

We know that each of us learns best in ways that often differ from the ways that others learn.  Why then would a professor want to teach in only one way, unless doing so protects the professor from being vulnerable to student ideas and enables the professor to maintain power over students?  If we care about the rights of others, if we believe we should respect one another, then surely we must be willing to respect culturally determined learning styles.  We cannot defend a power relationship that prevents students from learning when we teach in only one way or teach content that does not recognize the multiple heritages of our students, when we teach in a way that does not enable them to build upon their personal understanding of the world and that does not enable them to move toward the understandings of others.  So, also, administrators must be willing to recognize that faculty from different disciplines have themselves different ways of knowing the world distinct from the ways faculty of other disciplines know the world.  We must be willing openly to debate issues and share our perspectives both in and out of class if we hope to achieve a state of civility and pluralism.

The effort to recognize the diversity of the world is not solely about the rights of African Americans, Latinos, Asian Americans, and American Indians.  It is about power and the abuse of power, whether consciously or unknowingly.  It is revealed by race and ethnic distinctions, by the relationships between those in authority and those compelled to follow authority, by societally imposed roles for each gender, by an inability to come to grips with gender preferences, and by, as Professor Hildebrandt touched upon it, class.  As an intellectual and scholarly community, we have a responsibility to address those issues through what we teach, how we teach, and what we engage in outside of class.  If we simply complain about a lack of clarity in definitions of terms like multiculturalism, pluralism, and diversity, or use "political correctness" as a "straw man," we play into the hands of those who do not want to change the abuses that power allows to happen.  And that hurts.

Raymond J. Rodrigues is VP for Academic Affairs at North Adams State College

Kathleen R. Johnson

Volume 2.1 of this Newsletter began a discussion about the potential conflicts between the right of free speech and the existence of pornography, where the later is, as Lisa Tessman argues, "a tool of domination... interfer[ing] with a community's ability to engage in ethical thinking which would be truly collective or truly representative of the whole community."  Tessman encourages us to "work to end all forms of dominance and subordination."  In the following issue (2.2), Matt Silliman responds with a warning against political agendas "which are unattainable even in theory," for, he continues, "to do so gives us no real direction toward which to work, thus condemning us to the status quo."  While I agree with the general thrust of Silliman's remarks, I would like to comment on his more specific presuppositions and then raise some additional concerns of my own.

In response to Silliman's claim that the "natural fact of human diversity" will "inevitably" result in some who are "more powerful and influential," I think it important to note that while human physical or social differences may in some cases lead to power differentials, those differentials do not necessarily result in relations of dominance and subordination.  We can be encouraged by the fact that, at least so far, not all forms of human diversity reflect hierarchy.

Second, a movement toward equity demands the identification of acceptable, even desirable, forms of power.  The power of a collectivity's freely and democratically created moral norms is a case in point.  Perhaps we will want to encourage those legitimate forms of power to which Silliman refers, the power of artistic expression or the articulation of a charismatic speaker.  Yet even these will require agreed-upon limits and regulation.  But, of course, this recalls the present paradox:  While we refrain from restricting our rights to free speech, pornography undermines those same guarantees by contributing to the systematic silencing of women as a class.  In short, pornography indirectly interferes with women's equal access to the social and economic preconditions necessary to exercise their First Amendment rights.

Because this particular Amendment is so highly regarded in American culture, it is understandable that we place the burden of proof on those advocating restrictions.  As anti-pornography feminists work towards developing a clearer definition of pornography and legitimate forms of power, a more "attainable" goal (at least for the present) might be to argue for further restrictions on those forms of pornography that most people find objectionable, those involving violence and rape, for example.  In The Americanization of Sex , Edwin M. Schur raises a relevant and rarely asked question:  "Is there any reasonable justification for such depictions?  ...The usual rationale for protecting speech -- to ensure political, religious, educational, scientific, or artistic freedom -- may not really apply."

The apparent paradox associated with First Amendment guarantees to free speech and the "freedom" to produce pornography can leave us paralyzed and, by default, in support of the status quo.  Yet this is not because our goals are too high or "unattainable even in theory," but due at least in part to the lack of clarity in our conceptions of pornography and free speech and the relationship between these concepts and issues of diversity and power.

Kathleen R. Johnson teaches Sociology at Keene State College

Diana Davine

In response to Matt Silliman on the issue of pornography and domination (Thesis XII, 2.1), I agree that we do not have, in the context of domination, the conditions for truly free speech -- that is, speech that remains unconditioned by oppressive circumstances.  I agree, also, that rather than insisting on absolutely free speech as a precondition for any of our speech to be legitimate in a civic dialogue, perhaps a limited free speech would be an appropriate goal in those contexts.

I would question Silliman's interpretation of Tessman's precondition for a morally legitimate dialogue.  In particular, I do not believe Tessman uses the term "free speech" to refer to anyone's physical ability to speak louder or more articulately.  How the general acceptance of pornography by a community affects a woman's legal and professional "ability" to speak and be heard, is a more appropriate focus.  Does one dictate to the other?

Considering that sex has often been used as a tool of violence and domination against women, it is difficult to see pornography in the light that many (including Jeff Lawrence in the same issue) see it: as an entity without effect.  I see pornography as an extension of the former mind set and, therefore, find the conditions under which it exists an unsuitable environment for collective ethical thinking.

Diana Davine is a student at North Adams State College

David K. Johnson

In a previous issue of this Newsletter (2.1), I describe the basic structure of the radical constructivist challenge to (representative) realism as follows:

If the realist is to know what object a given idea or concept C1 represents, he or she must be able to compare C1 with that object.  But in order to determine whether O1 stands in some representational relation, say, R, to C1, he or she must (1) be acquainted with C1, R, and O1; and (2) know O1 other than by means of the concepts C1, C2 ... Cn.

In the very next issue (2.2), Neil Feit offers a defense of realist metaphysics founded on an inference to the best explanation of seemingly invariant sense data or successful action.  Feit's strategy is to accept condition (1) along with its tacit (intuitionist or direct) view of acquaintance ("I grant that a conscious experiencer may be acquainted with objects only by means of concepts") while rejecting condition (2) ("I deny that anything more than this is necessary for someone's knowing which objects her concepts represent").  With respect to the latter condition, he writes:
 
Condition (2) does not seem to me to be necessary -- if I have a visual image of a tree, most likely this alone lets me know which object the image represents: it is the tree at which I am looking (where the relation being a visual image of is the relation of represent-ation between the concept and the object).

Put simply:  the (representative) realist construes a visual image of a tree as representing a tree.  But it is not the mere use of representations that is at issue (every constructivist does that), but the purportedly concept- or mind-independent nature of the things represented (in this case, a tree).  The point of condition (2), therefore, is to challenge the realist's speculative move from images to essentially image-independent things.  It is tempting to suppose that constructivism is designed merely to remind us of the fallibility of all non-deductive inferences, including, induction, abduction, retroduction, and Feit's "inference to the best explanation."  Yet constructivists insist that theirs is the more "radical" thesis that our thoughts, words, and percepts do not and cannot refer (at all) to a concept- or mind-independent, objective reality.  In short, conditions (1) and (2) imply that realism is impossible.  It falls to the realist now to explain just how the constructivist defense of conditions (1) and (2) fails.  I can think of at least four reasons to reject those conditions.  Here's one.

Ernst von Glasersfeld's (1988) defense of constructivism is paradigmatic:

Whatever the subject perceives or conceives will necessarily be the result of the subject's ways and means of perceiving and conceiving -- and there is no way ever to compare these results with what there was in the first place ("An Exposition of Radical Constructivism").

Consider perception (the results will be analogous for conception).  There are at least four possible inter-pretations of this passage.  "Whatever the subject perceives" can refer either to (a) the objects of perception or to (b) the act of perceiving.  To say that these objects or acts "will necessarily be the result of the subject's ways and means of perceiving" suggests either that (c) the perception of these objects has as a necessary condition some form of perceptual activity or that (d) these objects are in some sense the creation of this activity.  Here are the possible combinations:

 1. (a, c) A perceptual act is a necessary condition for the perception of any object.
 2. (a, d) The objects of perception are created in the acts of perceiving them.
 3. (b, c) A perceptual act is a necessary condition for any perceptual act.
 4. (b, d) An act of perception is created in the act of perception.
 
1, 3, and 4 are trivially true while (2) is simply a statement of constructivism.  It follows that von Glasersfeld has, thus far, failed to place any restrictions on the possible objects of perception.  He variously defends (in 1, 3, and 4) the truism that all acts of perception involve acts of perception, and, in 2, simply assumes the truth of a doctrine opposed to realism.

Since the first half of von Glasersfeld's statement fails to provide any support for the constructivist thesis, it follows that the remainder of his statement -- that "there is no way ever to compare these results with what there was in the first place" -- amounts to the claim that we are constitutively unable (for some mysterious reason) to compare the objects of perception to some (rather mysterious) state of affairs called "what there was in the first place."  Now if we want simply to assume from the start that realism is wrong and constructivism right, we have only to "conclude" from the first set of tautologies (1, 3, or 4) or statement of idealism (2) that we cannot perceive or conceive of the realist's mind-independent objects.  von Glasersfeld's  argument for constructivism (and, therefore, for conditions (1) and (2)), is (viciously) circular.

David K. Johnson teaches Philosophy at North Adams State College