|
Philosophy
THESIS ELEVEN
A PHILOSOPHICAL NEWSLETTER
© 1994 (May)
Volume 1, No. 2
Inside this Issue:
NOTE FROM THE EDITOR
DAVID K. JOHNSON
CLASSIC GENIUS: RESPONSE TO POST-LAURIA
MATT SILLIMAN
DEMOCRACY ANYONE?
GRETA PHINNEY
ON CONSTRUCTING REALITY: RESPONSE
TO MELTZ GREEN
ERNST VON GLASERSFELD
CIVIL RIGHTS AND WRONGS: RESPONSE
TO K. JOHNSON
NICOLE TARDIFF, NICOLE WRY, HEIDI STRASNICK,
and MELINDA TOPHAM
SCIENCE AND SUBJECTIVITY: RESPONSE TO LUCZYNSKI
DANIEL POTVIN
ON THE SEX OF THE KNOWER:
RESPONSE TO CODE
DAVID LUCZYNSKI
ANIMAL RIGHTS: RESPONSE TO PEDERCINI
MATT SILLIMAN
DAVID K. JOHNSON
Not to leave any disciplinary stone
unturned, this issue of Thesis Eleven includes several faculty and student
responses to questions raised in the last issue concerning the nature of
science, democracy, and literary genius; the proper bounds of job protection
and nonhuman animal rights; and the ontological presuppositions (or lack
thereof) of constructivist epistemology. Once again, I warmly invite
friends of the discipline everywhere, from every perspective and from every
corner of our academic community, to participate in and enjoy these reflexes
of the philosophical spirit.
DAVID K. JOHNSON, EDITOR
NASC
Return to Table of Contents
Return to Archive
CLASSIC GENIUS
RESPONSE TO POST-LAURIA
Iappreciate Sheila Post-Lauria's observation of a discrepancy between
how "classic" writers thought of their work and how those who later redefined
interpretive categories such as "classic" have come to view them.
"Genius" in the twentieth century is frequently, if not always, understood
to imply idiosyncrasy and isolation, whereas it was usually understood
in the nineteenth century as a product (and, in Hegel's terms, the highest
expression) of a social context.
Perhaps one lesson here is that to the extent that we place importance
on historical texts, we owe them the courtesy of a thoughtful reading,
one which takes into account how the authors and their times understood
their projects. We might well reinterpret a book in terms of our own (possibly
more insightful) categories afterwards, but why praise a book at all unless
it is worth reading on its own terms?
MATT SILLIMAN
NASC
Return to Table of Contents
Return to Archive
DEMOCRACY ANYONE?
We often claim to live in a democratic society. What specific
relationships or institutions do you participate in that actually operate
on democratic principles?
GRETA PHINNEY
UMASS-AMHERST.
Return to Table of Contents
Return to Archive
ON CONSTRUCTING REALITY
RESPONSE TO MELTZ GREEN
In her note on "Constructing Reality" Christine Meltz Green asks (a)
how my view of the subjectivity of knowledge differs from Kant's and (b)
whether I am not "simply an idealist." If by subjectivity we intend
(as I believe Kant did) that the elements out of which we build up our
knowledge do not originate outside us in an independent "reality,"
I am, indeed, in agreement with Kant. But I have followed Piaget
and tried to show that some of the items Kant thought to be given a priori
(e.g., space, time, causality) can also be seen as constructed by the thinking
subject.
But subjects cannot construct as they might like. Their actions
and the viability of their mental constructs are always constrained by
the reality they experience. Idealists tend to disregard this, and
therefore I do not consider myself an idealist. But experiencing
constraints does not entail coming to know what, on the other side of the
experiential interface, could be held responsible for the obstacles met
and the failures incurred. Both can be thought of and described only
in terms of the subject's own concepts of actions and objects. Thus
I do not believe that facts "stand outside of one's experience."
Rather, I would say, they are conclusions drawn from experience which,
for one reason or another, one does not intend to question for the time
being.
ERNST VON GLASERSFELD
UMASS-AMHERST
Return to Table of Contents
Return to Archive
CIVIL RIGHTS AND WRONGS
RESPONSE TO K. JOHNSON
It is often thought that members of the KKK, being part of the white
majority and having no oppression to fight against, are just bigots who
do not deserve to have their voices heard. There is also the argument
that members of some minority hate groups ...are attempting to establish
their identity and are, therefore, justified in their actions. There
can be no absolute right or wrong. Hate speech is oppressive; it
may not be deemed acceptable within the social realm, but it is legal and
[every person's] constitutional right.
NICOLE TARDIFF
UMASS-AMHERST
This situation is a catch 22. If the employer's reason for not
wanting members of a hate group to be employed in [his/her] company is
because its members discriminate, then that employer is also discriminating
against [those] members.
NICOLE WRY
UMASS-AMHERST
I don't believe that it would be possible to have laws [that] discriminate
against hate groups. Who is to judge who is in a hate group?
Opinions may differ. [We] can work around the system and not hire
[members of hate groups].
HEIDI STRASNICK
UMASS-AMHERST
Where to draw the line between people who deserve this protection and
those who do not is not arbitrary. Membership in a group that is
based not on choice should be the criterion.
MELINDA TOPHAM
UMASS-AMHERST
Return to Table of Contents
Return to Archive
SCIENCE AND SUBJECTIVITY
RESPONSE TO LUCZYNSKI
You asked about the nature of science. I believe Grampa Brown
is participating in a scientific experiment. Other times when Grampa
Brown combined the same ingredients using the same method he made bread.
His expectations and knowledge of the method will force a "reaction" to
the expected, though uncertain, outcome. What I am alluding to is
similar to the idea in physics of the uncertainty principle. ...Although
it is quite probable that Grampa Brown will make bread, the outcome is
not certain.
DANIEL POTVIN
RENSSELAER POLYTECHNIC INSTITUTE
Return to Table of Contents
Return to Archive
ON THE SEX OF THE KNOWER
RESPONSE TO CODE
The institutionalization (in epistemology and elsewhere) of stereotypical
male values is indeed significant, especially for those too young or naive
to notice. Someone, a judge for example, who read a philosophical
or scientific account that had a male bias, might be influenced in favor
of the "male" point of view without knowing it, thus perpetuating the male/female
dichotomy.
DAVID LUCZYNSKI NASC
Return to Table of Contents
Return to Archive
ANIMAL RIGHTS
RESPONSE TO PEDERCINI
I agree with Nan Pedercini that viewing animals as non-thinking, non-sentient
beings is a transparently speciesist and self-serving excuse for using
them for our own purposes. I wonder, however, whether it could sometimes
be justifiable to use animals for our own purposes, even assuming that
they are sentient and conscious (though perhaps not self-conscious or morally
accountable), provided we did so in a way which respected the animal's
quality of life.
Factory farms and slaughterhouses seem obviously immoral, but what of
someone who raises chickens or goats in a healthy, happy, and comfortable
environment, where their freedom of movement and association are not unduly
restricted, and uses their eggs, milk, manure, and (eventually) meat for
the benefit of human life? If no gratuitous cruelty is involved,
what harm is done, either to the animals or to the character of humans?
MATT SILLIMAN
NASC
Return to Table of Contents
Return to Archive
Matt Silliman's suggestion -- that we may benefit from and eventually
consume nonhuman animals in ways that are respectful of the animals' "quality
of life" -- while logically possible (in the case of collecting the eggs
from free-range hens, for example) and a clear advance over unqualified
speciesism, strikes me as (in reverse order of importance) impractical,
psychologically problematic, and opposed to the spirit (and, depending
on the proper interpretation of the term "eventually," possibly the letter)
of animal liberation.
If "eventually" means "after a while but before the natural death of
the individual," then this position is clearly opposed to the animal liberationist
goal of extending direct moral consideration to some nonhuman animals.
Securing respect for an individual's "quality of life" is a life-long task.
All sentient nonhumans, while unable (I think) to take an active interest
in prolonging life, do (like humans) have an interest in remaining alive.
And having (rather than taking) an interest in life is sufficient to make
one vulnerable to suffering the harm that premature death represents.
It follows that to kill (painlessly, secretly, lovingly, and so on) a nonhuman
animal is to exploit it.
If "eventually" means "following the natural death of the nonhuman animal,"
then this position is logically (though not practically or psychologically)
consistent with animal liberation. It is not obviously exploitative
-- assuming anyone would be so inclined -- to consume the flesh of nonhumans
who have died of old age and lived their entire lives as well-cared-for
pets.
Yet this is surely an odd and impractical scheme: years of expensive
and labor-intensive care, producing a meager output of easily replaceable
animal products and edible (though probably unsafe and unattractive) flesh.
Is this not simply an ideological relic of speciesism?
DAVID K. JOHNSON
NASC
Return to Table of Contents
Return to Archive
|
