‡ (Epistemological Skeptic): What exactly is this "Representative Realism" you speak of?

(Representative Realist): I will be glad to explain: representative realism is the view that the mind does not provide direct access to reality, but rather represents it much as a photograph does. The objects that presumably exist in the world outside of ourselves (the "real stuff") are connected to us through our senses. We are similar to a camera in this sense: we get a very good idea of what the external world is, because our eyes see it and capture it, and our brain "develops the film" into an image we can recognize. This image represents the real, although it is not ‘the real’ in itself.

ES: I see, very intriguing. Let me get this straight however; You claim that we cannot have direct access to reality, but we can gain a concept of the "external world" through our perception of it?

RR: When there is intersubjective agreement about our experience of an object, we then have reason to assume it exists outside of any particular mind. I do not claim that our senses could not deceive. My claim is only that we cannot have direct knowledge of an object which does exist outside of us, either because of an underlying feature of human knowers which forbids it; or because we would need to be the object in order to eliminate the gap between the "knower" and the "known."

ES: For the sake of argument, I will grant that there is a world outside of mind that is not entirely of our creation. Moreover, I’ll indulge your "representative realism" by granting that we know only through representations. However, since you cannot compare objects directly with concepts, how can you be sure which objects correspond to which concepts (or that there is any kind of correspondence)?

RR: This is easily explained. There is a necessary relationship between the concept and the object to which the concept refers. The string which attaches the two, the relationship, which you and I both are capable of knowing when we identify everyday things, is a capability we all share and almost take for granted. When we experience an object and gain an impression of it, we create a concept and a label for it. For example, when we first see a car, we retain in our mind the concept of it, so the next time we see the car, we are able to identify it. The relationship between the object and the concept is not a loose one, or else our mind would not function in the efficient way that it does. We might think the car is a house, or even a horse, or a wheelbarrow. This does not happen, however, because the concept exists in our brain – and we know which objects correspond to which concepts, because of the innate reciprocity of the relationship.

ES: Even so, there still is this gap – the gap between the concept and the object. Even if your views were correct, there still would exist this gap, am I correct?

RR: You are.

ES: So, therefore, since there is this gap between the knower, and the "objects" that the knower claims to perceive, you can hardly be certain of the "real." For example, have you ever walked down the road, glanced across the street, and thought that for sure you saw a close friend, but as you took a closer look and approached the person, you noticed that the person was not your friend, but just a look-alike?

RR: Yes, of course.

ES: And I’m sure there have been many times when you thought you saw someone or something, maybe after a hard day at work or being very tired, and at second glance noticed that you were just "seeing things;" that nothing was there at all. In these cases, what are these representations corresponding to? If we gain our concepts of the real through visual representations of it, but at times such as those I have just mentioned the representations in fact represented nothing real at all, how can you ever trust your senses? So far, I find three major faults in your view: (1) it is possible for us to misperceive objects in the world, (2) our senses are susceptible to illusions, and (3) it is unclear how much epistemological value perceptions have, or to what extent, if at all, belief should be rooted in that which we perceive.

RR: I concede that illusions and error are possible. But should we take such exceptional cases as determinative or normative? We surely both agree that we are actually perceiving this table before us and not some illusion.

ES: I’ll grant that. But consider the chair against the wall at the end of the room. How can you be certain, epistemically, that your mental representation actually corresponds to the chair itself, since you concede that you only know the chair through your representation of it?

RR: I can check the accuracy of my representation quite simply by asking others to describe their experiences and representations of the same chair. If their uses for it and descriptions of it fit my image well, I have at least some independent confirmation that I am correctly representing the chair.

ES: You seem to be a very trusting person! Are you sure you can trust you neighbor’s experiences and representations, and the congruency of their representation with yours?

RR: I have no problem with trusting my peers because I recognize that knowing is a discursive process, which does involve trust, as well one’s own sensory perception, and systematic investigation – not direct knowing. I also recognize the epistemological fallibility in trust. However, to arrive at knowledge, you need to trust your senses, and other people’s senses as well. You will then at least have an idea that the object in the world outside of you is representing something that is corresponding to the epistemic concepts of more than one person. In this sense, although we may not have direct knowledge of the object, we know our representation of it checks out, because of agreement with other’s experiences.*